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Public Employee Bargaining in North Carolina: From
Paternalism to Confusion
Public employee collective bargaining and negotiation has received in-
creasing attention in North Carolina, as in other states, in recent years.' Un-
like the majority of states, however, North Carolina has passed no legislation
establishing formal procedures for communication between governmental
units and their employees. 2 In North Carolina public sector labor relations
are currently regulated by a single statute, hurriedly enacted in 1959 and never
revised. One commentator has called the state's attitude, as reflected by this
statute, section 95-98, "without question. . . the most adamant in its opposi-
tion to public sector unionism."'3 The section provides that:
Any agreement, or contract, between the governing authority of
any city, town, county, or other municipality, or between any agency,
unit, or instrumentality thereof, or between any agency, instrumen-
tality, or institution of the State of North Carolina, and any labor
union, trade union, or labor organization, as bargaining agent for
any public employees of such city, town, county or other municipal-
ity, or agency or instrumentality of government, is hereby declared to
be against the public policy of the state, illegal, unlawful, void and of
no effect.
4
Section 95-98 has created considerable confusion and has been the subject
of much misinterpretation since its enactment. 5 As increasing numbers of
public employees in North Carolina seek to meet, negotiate or bargain with
their employers through a chosen representative, 6 accurate interpretation of
1. While increased demands for collective bargaining rights and a few ublicized public
employee union campaigns have prompted much of the recent awareness in North Carolina, a
number of less obvious factors are also responsible. These include the rapid growth in the number
of public employees in the modem American workforce, see text accompanying notes 7-12 infra;
the equally rapid increase of membership in public employee unions and associations, see text
accompanying notes 13-23 infra; the federal government's institution of collective bargaining for
many of its employees, see text accompanying notes 28-29 infra; and the relatively recent enact-
ment of statutes authorizing some form of collective bargaining in the majority of states, see text
accompanying notes 30-34 infra. See generally, R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1974); McCann & Smiley, The NationalLabor Relations
Act and the Regulation ofPublic Employee Collective Bargaining, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 479 (1976).
2. See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
3. Nolan, Public Employee Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C. L.
REV. 235, 287 (1978).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975).
5. See N.C. STUDY COMM'N. ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, REPORT OF THE GOV-
ERNOR'S STUDY ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, 3-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.C.
STUDY COMM'N.J; Brooks, 4nother Look at Labor Laws, N.C. PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTER 9
(Spring 1980); Haemmel, Impasse in N. C.: The Needfor a Viable Public Employees Labor Rela-
tions Act, 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 190 (1973); Pfefferkom, Professional Negotiations in North Carolina-
An Alternative to Formal Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 189
(197 1); Note, North Carolina General Statute Section 95-98-Voiding Contracts Between State Gov-
ernmental Units and Public Employee Labor Organizations-Is Constitutional, 11 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1975).
6. Mercer & Thompson, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in North Carolina, N.C.
COUNTYLINES 5, Oct. 31, 1979, at 5.
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the statute becomes a pressing concern. This Comment, after looking briefly
at the recent growth of public sector employment and unionism and at public
sector collective bargaining legislation in other jurisdictions, discusses the his-
tory of section 95-98 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the confusion
concerning its proper meaning, and the differing degrees of interaction be-
tween public sector employers and unions that exist as a result of that confu-
sion.
I. THE RECENT INCREASE IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
ORGANIZATIONS
Primarily because of the growth of the general population and an in-
creased demand for government programs and services, the public sector has
grown dramatically in recent decades-faster than any other segment of the
economy.7 Public employees now number nearly twenty percent of the Amer-
ican work force, the largest growth occurring in state and local, rather than
federal, government employment.8 The number of state and local government
employees has increased fourfold since 1945, 9 and, because one in every four
new jobs is created in the public sector, growth is expected to continue.10 The
growth rate of state and local government employees in North Carolina for the
same thirty year period has matched the national increase." Over a quarter of
a million of the state's citizens are now so employed.' 2
The recent growth of public employee union and association membership
across the nation has been equally dramatic. Despite legal barriers restraining
the effectiveness of public employee labor organizations, impediments not
faced in the private sector, public employee membership in unions and em-
ployee associations has been growing at a rate many times that of the private
sector' 3 and is expected to continue to grow in the future.' 4 Almost every
major union that organizes state and local government employees has exper-
7. Usery, Bargaining in the Public Sector: Problems, Progress and Prospects, 1 OKLA. CITY
L. REV. 1, 3 (1976).
8. See generally 2 Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 71:2001.
9. Comment, Constitutional mplications of a Federal Collective Bargaining Lawfor State and
Local Government Employees, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 863, 865 n.16 (1978).
10. 2 Govr EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 71:2001.
11. In 1946, state and local government employees in North Carolina numbered approxi-
mately 73,000. In 1975 there were approximately 288,000. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES-19
7 7 at 307 (1977); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES
710-11 (1960).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATEs-1977 at 307 (1977).
13. Nationwide, membership in unions among employees of state and local governments rose
from 556,000 in 1964 to 1,710,000 in 1976, an increase of 307.6%. Union membership among
nongovernmental employees increased only 9.3% during the same period. Nolan, supra note 3, at
236 n.1 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS-REFERENCE EDITION, Table 155, at 384 (1975); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORS OF NAT'L UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE AsS'NS 177).
14. PUB. AD. SURVEY 1 (Bureau of Governmental Research, U. of Miss. 1977).
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ienced this growth, 15 and one such union, the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, is among the fastest growing in the na-
tion.' 6 Nearly one-half the full-time or equivalent employees of state and lo-
cal governments have joined unions. 17 By comparison, less than one-fourth of
the total United States work force is unionized.'
8
Public employee organization in North Carolina and in neighboring
southeastern states is not as widespread as in most of the nation.19 Neverthe-
less, over thirty percent of North Carolina's full-time state and local govern-
ment employees are organized into unions or employee associations. 20 Almost
all of the major municipalities in the state have at least one public employee
union representing some portion of its workforce.2 ' Furthermore, efforts to
organize public employees in states such as North Carolina are expected to
increase substantially in the years ahead.
22
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LEGISLATION
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Private sector labor relations are regulated primarily by the National La-
bor Relations Act.23 The Act, passed in 1935,24 committed the nation to col-
lective bargaining as the primary means of ensuring industrial peace and
preventing economic disruption. 25 The Act, however, does not regulate public
employee labor relations. 26 As a result, regulation of federal, state, and local
15. Usery, supra note 7, at 3.
16. 0. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 327 (7th ed. 1976). See Usery, supra
note 7, at 94.
17. [1977] 94 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 199.
18. [1978] 97 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 73.
19. Nolan, supra note 3, at 236. See Jedel & Rutherford, Public Labor Relations in the South.
east; Review, Synthesis and Prognosis, 25 LAB. L.J. 483, 488 (1974).
20. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS
(1979), reprinted in 2 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 71:4091, 71:4107. This figure
includes membership in state employee associations. Although in many states today the distinc-
tion between a state employees' association and a union may be insignificant for practical pur-
poses, this is not yet the case in most of the southeastern states. See Jedel & Rutherford, supra
note 20, at 488. The number of actual public employee "union" members in North Carolina is
considerably less. Id
21. NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, N.C. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT,
FRINGE BENEFITS AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES FOR CITIES ABOVE 5,000 POPULATION AS OF JULY,
1979, at 15 (1979).
22. McGriff, supra note 15, at 2. See text accompanying notes 119-121 infra.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
24. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449.
25. See generally McCann & Smiley, supra note 1, at 484.
26. Section 2(2) of the Act defines "employer" to include: "[Any person acting as an agent
of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). Section 2(3) of the NLRA similarly excludes from the
definition of "employee" the employees of any person not within the definition of "employer." ld
§ 152(3). Because the protections and prohibitions of the NLRA are, with few exceptions, appli-
cable only to "employers" and "employees," the effect of § 2(2) is to exclude governments and
public employees from the coverage of the Act.
When the original NLRA was passed in 1935, there seemed to be little serious consideration
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government employer-employee labor relations, including collective bargain-
ing rights, was left to the respective employing governments.
In 1962 the federal government granted collective bargaining rights to
most of its employees. 27 Subsequently both the executive and legislative
branches have expanded these rights.2 8 State legislatures have also recognized
the importance of collective bargaining to public employees in the past twenty
years. Beginning with Wisconsin in 1959,29 thirty-eight states have enacted
legislation allowing collective bargaining or meet-and-confer communications
for all or some groups of their public employees.30 Other states have achieved
the same result through constitutional amendments, court decisions, attorney
generals' opinions, or a combination of these. 31 Relatively few states have
refused to afford any collective bargaining rights, and only one, North Caro-
lina, statutorily prohibits collectively bargained contracts for all public em-
ployees. 32 The different state statutes vary widely in content and scope. Some
are so comprehensive as to almost duplicate private sector law, while others
whether public employees should be included under the Act. For a discussion of this issue, see
McCann & Smiley, supra note 1, at 485.
27. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compilation).
28. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), promulgated by President
Nixon in October 1968, provided the basic framework for federal employee collective bargaining
until 1978. With the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, - Stat.
- (codified in releventpart at 5 U.S.C §§ 7101-7135 (1980)), Congress codified collective bargain-
ing procedures for federal employees and provided, in addition, apparatus for prevention of un-
fair labor practices and regulation of union conduct in the federal sector. Part of the Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1980), reserves to the President the power to promulgate regulations for the conduct of
federal employees.
Chapter 12 of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codi-
fied at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1976)), governs labor-management relations in the Postal Service
and in general makes the Postal Service subject to the NLRA. The Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964 provides the authority for federal grants to local transportation authorities to acquire,
improve, and operate regional transportation facilities. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1643 (1976). As a con-
dition of assistance, recipients must assure the Secretary of Labor that arrangements have been
made to protect the rights of employees affected by the assistance, with the right to continue
engaging in collective bargaining with the employer authority through an employee representa-
tive. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976). When private companies have been taken over by governmental
authorities with federal assistance, public employees are guaranteed collective bargaining rights
regardless of the applicable state law concerning public employee bargaining. This is true even
where state law, as in North Carolina, prohibits public employee collective bargaining contracts.
In many such states, public agencies are created to receive federal grants, but the construction and
operation of the transportation facilities are contracted out to private companies. The private
companies must bargain with the representatives of their employees. McCann & Smiley, supra
note 1, at 494-95. See generally Barnum, National Public Labor Relations Legislation: The Case of
Urban Mass Transit, 27 LAB. L.J. 168 (1976); see also note 83 infra.
29. Act of Sept. 22, 1959, 1959 Wis. Laws 623 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70-
.97 (1974)).
30. 2 Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 71:2004-05. The term "meet and con-
fee' is popularly used to describe several different types of negotiation. The pure meet and confer
approach implies discussions leading to a unilateral adoption of policy by a legislative body rather
than a written contract and occurs with multiple employee representatives rather than with exclu-
sive bargaining agents. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, supra note 1, at 346. As used in
this Comment, the term refers to a permissive model: public employers may discuss working
conditions with unions and may in some cases memorialize in writing understandings reached, but
may not enter into a binding collective bargaining contract. See Nolan, supra note 3, at 275.
31. 2 GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 71:2004-05.
32. Id
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are far less inclusive.33 In sum, bargaining by many public employees through
selected representatives has become a fact of life in the large majority of states.
III. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 95-9834
A. Enactment
Section 95-98 is the direct result of a highly publicized effort in 1958 by
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, headed nationally by Jimmy
Hoffa, to organize members of the Charlotte Police Department.35 In early
January 1959 the Charlotte city manager wrote to the state Attorney General
expressing concern about "labor unions among municipal personnel, with par-
ticular reference to our Police Department. '3 6 He "urgently requested" an
opinion whether the city council had the legal right to prohibit police officers
and other city employees from joining unions.3 7 The Attorney General re-
plied that the city did indeed have such a right, and that any employee who
insisted on joining a union could be discharged.38 The Attorney General fur-
ther stated that neither the city nor its individual departments had the right to
enter into any collective bargaining agreement concerning wages, hours, and
working conditions. 39 He also determined that the state's "right-to-work"
law,40 which proscribes the conditioning of employment on nonunion status,
did not apply to the City of Charlotte as an employer.41
City officials, acting on this opinion, ordered the police union disbanded
and forbade membership by its policemen in the union.42 A few weeks later a
representative from Mecklenburg County introduced a bill in the legislature
which, as subsequently amended and enacted, is now sections 95-97 to -100,
constituting article 12, "Public Employees Prohibited from Becoming Mem-
bers of Trade Unions or Labor Unions."'43 Originally, the first section of the
33. Id Comparison of these various statutes is beyond the scope of this study, but has been
treated thoroughly by others. See, e.g., Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective
and Legislative Opportunities, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 57, 62-78 (1973); Howlett, Overview of
State Public Employment Legislation: Its History and Present Development, I OKLA. CITY L. REv.
15 (1976); Comment, supra note 9, at 856-67.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975).
35. Raleigh News & Observer, May 20, 1959, at 2. No official legislative history concerning
§ 95-98 exists. The history discussed in the text was gathered primarily from newspaper accounts.
36. Letter from H.A. Yancey, Charlotte City Manager, to Malcolm B. Seawell, N.C. Attor-
ney General (Jan. 5, 1959).
37. Id
38. Letter from Malcolm B. Seawell, N.C. Attorney General, to H.A. Yancey, Charlotte City
Manager, at 10 (Jan. 8, 1959).
39. Id
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1975). Section 95-81 provides that "[nlo person shall be
required by any employer to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor
organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment."
41. Letter from Malcolm B. Seawell, N.C. Attorney General, to H.A. Yancey, Charlotte City
Manager, at 11 (Jan. 8, 1959).
42. Raleigh News & Observer, Jan. 9, 1959, at 30, col. 6.
43. ARTICLE 12




bill, now section 95-97, may have been meant to apply to all public employees,
but was limited in committee to preclude only police officers and firefighters
from joining any union affiliated in any way with a national or international
union organized for collective bargaining. 44 The section further prohibited
firefighters and policemen from assisting or promoting the organization of
such a union.45 This bar on union membership by policemen and firefighters
generated most of the headlines and coverage of the bill at the time.
46
The second section of the bill, section 95-98, now simply declares any
"agreement, or contract" between a governing agency and any labor union as
bargaining agent for any public employees to be against "the public policy of
the State, illegal, unlawful, void, and of no effect." 47 A rejected version of this
section also would have made unlawful any combination or "understanding,"
as well as any contract and agreement, whether oral or written, between a
G.S. 95-97. Employees of units of government prohibitedfrom becoming members of
trade unions or labor unions.-No employee of the State of North Carolina, or of any
agency, office, institution or instrumentality thereof, or any employee of a city, town,
county, or other municipality or agency thereof, or any public employee or employees of
an entity or instrumentality of government shall be, become, or remain a member of any
trade union, labor union, or labor organization which is, or may become, a part of or
affiliated in any way with any national or international labor union, federation, or organ-
ization, and which has as its purpose or one of its purposes, collective bargaining with
any employer mentioned in this Article with respect to grievances, labor disputes, wages
or salary, rates of pay, hours of employment, or the conditions of work of such employ-
ees. Nor shall such an employee organize or aid, assist or promote the organization of
any such trade union, labor union, or labor organization, or affiliate with any such or-
ganization in any capacity whatsoever.
The terms 'employee,' 'public employee' or 'employees' whenever used in this sec-
tion shall mean any regular and full-time employee engaged exclusively in law enforce-
ment or fire prevention activity.
G.S. 95-98. Contracts between units of government and labor unions, trade unions or
labor organizations concerning public employees declared to be illegal.-Any agreement,
or contract, between the governing authority of any city, town, county, or other munici-
pality, or between any agency, unit, or instrumentality, or institution of the State of
North Carolina, and any labor union, trade union, or labor organization, as bargaining
agent for any public employees of such city, town, county or other municipality, or
agency or instrumentality of government, is hereby declared to be hgainst the public
policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, void and of no effect.
G.S. 95-99. Penaltyfor violation of Article. Any violation of the provisions of this
Article is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, plea of guilty or
plea of nolo contendere shall be punishable in the discretion of the court.
G.S. 95-100. No provisions of Article 10of Chapter 95 applicable to units of govern-
ment or their employees.-The provisions of Article 10 of Chapter 95 of the General
Statutes shall not apply to the State of North Carolina or any agency, institution, or
instrumentality thereof or the employees of same nor shall the provisions of Article 10 of
Chapter 95 of the General Statutes apply to any public employees or any employees of
any town, city, county or other municipality or the agencies or instrumentalities thereof,
nor shall said Article apply to employees of the State or any agencies, instrumentalities
or institutions thereof or to any public employees whatsoever.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-97 to -100 (1975).
44. Raleigh News & Observer, May 9, 1959, at 5, col. 3; id, May 20, 1959, at 1, col. I.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1975).
46. See, e.g., Bill Barring Policemen, Firemenfrom Unions is Passed by House, Raleigh News
& Observer, May 21, 1959, at 1, col. 6; Union Ban Bill Voted, Charlotte Observer, May 21, 1959, at
1, col. 4; Don't Single Out Firemen, Raleigh News & Observer, May 22, 1959, at 4, col. 2; Bill
Barring Unions for Firemen, Policemen Passed by Assembly, Raleigh News & Observer, June 4,
1959, at 1, col. 6; N.C. Outlaws Police Unions, Charlotte Observer, June 4, 1959, at 1, ol. I.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975).
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governing authority and a union, relating to grievances, labor disputes, wages
or salary, hours of employment, or conditions of work.48 The rejected section
further prohibited any public officer from negotiating, or attempting to negoti-
ate such a contract, either directly or indirectly.
4 9
The third section of the measure, now section 95-99, made any violation
of the provisions of article 12 a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonmentso
of up to two years.51 The final section, now section 95-100, made the "right-
to-work" law inapplicable to public employees.52
Debate over the measure in both the House and the Senate centered pri-
marily around "boogie man Jimmy Hoffa" 53-the bill's sponsor indicating
that its purpose was to keep the "ill-famed Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters
union [from coming] into North Carolina."54 Those opposing the article
called the bill both unconstitutional 55 and a "hate bill. . . filled with hate for
organized labor."56 Despite the emotional tenor of the debate, the measure
48. Committee Substitute for H.B. 118, 1959 Session read:
G.S. 95-86. Labor contracts between units ofstate government andlabor unions, trade
unions or labor organizations concerning public employees declared to be ilegal.-Any
agreement, combination, understanding or contract, whether the same shall be oral or
written, between the governing authority of any city, town, county or other municpality or
between any agency, unit or instrumentality thereof or between any agency, instrumentality
or institution of the State of North Carolina and any labor union, trade union or labor
organization, relating to the grievances, labor disputes, wages or salary, rates of pay,
hours of employment, maintenance of membership or conditions of work of anypublic
employees ofsuch city, town, county or other municpality, or agencies or instrumentalities
of government, are hereby declared to be against the public policy of the State, illegal,
unlawful, void and of no effect. No public officer of the State or of any subdivision of
government of the State or of any agency or instrumentality of the State or of any city,
town, county or other municipality or of any agency or instrumentality thereof, whether
acting singly or as a member of any board, commission or committee, shall negotiate,
aid, abet or assist in or attempt to negotiate, either directly or indirectly, any contract,
agreement or understanding, with or between any such agency, instrumentality or unit of
government and any labor union, trade union or labor organization concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages or salary, rates of pay, hours of employment, maintenance
of membership or conditions of work of any public employees, employees of the State of
North Carolina, or employees of any city, town, country or other municipality or em-
ployees of any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(emphasis added to illustrate the language from the rejected proposal that was actually enacted as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975)). The phrase "relating to the grievances, labor disputes, wages or
salary, rates of pay, hours of employment, maintenance of membership or conditions of work of
." was replaced with "as bargaining agent for...
49. Id
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-99 (1975).
51. See State v. Adams, 266 N.C. 406, 146 S.E.2d 505 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(a)
(1969).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-100 (1975). This section's careful exclusion of public employees
was presumably to avoid confict between the "right-to-work" provisions protecting union mem-
bership as well as nonmembership and other state and local prohibitions on union membership by
public employees. Compare id §§ 95-78, -81 with id § 95-97. Cf. Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 8,
1959) (municipality may prohibit employees from joining unions); see also Raleigh News & Ob-
server, May 20, 1959, at 2, col. 2.
53. Raleigh News & Observer, May 20, 1959, at 1, col. 1; id May 21, 1959, at 1, col. 6.
54. Id June 3, 1959, at 3, col. 2.
55. Id May 9, 1959, at 5, col. 3; id June 3, 1959, at 3, col. 2.
56. Id June 4, 1959, at 7, col. 6.
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eventually passed both houses by wide margins,57 although the section of
greatest significance today, that voiding collectively-bargained contracts, re-
ceived little attention on the floor. As enacted the new statute forbade police-
men and firemen from joining nationally-affiliated unions, authorized
governmental units to employ only non-union labor and declared invalid any
contracts or agreements reached between those units permitting union mem-
bership and the unions representing their employees.58
B. Constitutional Challenges
Section 95-98 has been attacked twice on constitutional grounds. Ten
years after the enactment of article 12, Charlotte firefighters challenged section
95-98 and its companion provisions on first amendment grounds in Atkins v.
City of Charlotte." For many years prior to the enactment of article 12, mem-
bers of the Fire Department had belonged to a local affiliate of the Interna-
tional Association of Firefighters (IAF), which engaged in bargaining with the
city.60 After the statutes were passed the local group terminated its affiliation
with the IAF, but continued its activities, including negotiations with the
city.61 In 1962 the city council, on the recommendation of the city manager,
established nonmembership in the union as a requirement of continued em-
ployment. For the next few years all union activities were terminated.
62
Members of the fire department, however, organized a new association several
years later. Members of the association, aided by the IAF, petitioned the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to
declare section 95-97 in violation of freedom of association rights guaranteed
by the first and fourteenth amendments.
63
Judge Craven, writing for a three-judge panel, held section 95-97 uncon-
stitutional on its face as an abridgement of freedom of association. 64 Citing
N44 CP v. Alabama ex re. Patterson,65 the court stated that freedom of associ-
ation is an aspect of liberty protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and by the rights of free speech and free assembly of the
first amendment.66 The court found section 95-97 overbroad because it indis-
criminately prohibited the right of association in a labor union.67 Legitimate
state interests such as prevention of strikes by firefighters could be prevented
by other, less restrictive, legislation.68 The court also found section 95-99 un-
57. Id
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-97 to -100 (1975).
59. 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
60. Id at 1072.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 1073.
64. Id at 1075. Section 95-97 prohibited policemen or firefighters from joining any national
labor union.
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. 296 F. Supp. at 1075.
67. Id at 1076.
68. Id at 1077.
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constitutional on the ground that it provided "an in terrorem provision in-
tended to make certain that no employee of the State or its subordinate
municipal corporations should so much as lift a finger to form or join a labor
union."
'69
The court did, however, declare section 95-98 constitutional, stating:
We find nothing unconstitutional in G.S. § 95-98. It simply
voids contracts between units of government within North Carolina
and labor unions and expresses the public policy of North Carolina
to be against such collective bargaining contracts. There is nothing
in the United States Constitution which entitles one to have a con-
tract with another who does not want it. It is but a step further to
hold that the state may lawfully forbid such contracts with its instru-
mentalities. The solution, if there be one, from the viewpoint of the
firemen, is that labor unions may someday persuade state govern-
ment of the asserted value of collective bargaining agreements, but
this is a political matter and does not yield to judicial solution. The
right to a collective bargaining agreement, so firmly entrenched in
American labor-management relations, rests upon national legisla-
tion and not upon the federal Constitution. The State is within the
powers reserved to it to refuse to enter into such agreements and so to
declare by statute.
70
Section 95-98, the only section still valid after Atkins, 7' was challenged a
few years later in Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit, N. C Ass'n of Educators
v. Phiips.72 Through the use of negotiations and "sanctions", 73 the Winston-
Salem/Forsyth County Unit of the North Carolina Association of Educators
had successfully campaigned in 1967 for a school tax plan providing annual
increases in the local teachers' supplement.74 The discontinuation of this plan
by the Forsyth County Commissioners in 1972 prompted the teacher's union
to challenge the statute. The union alleged that one reason for the termination
of the supplement plan had been the discovery by government officials of sec-
tion 95-98. Furthermore, the school board's refusal to enter into any contract
or meaningful discussion allegedly was based on section 95-98. 7- The union
argued, therefore, section 95-98 was unconstitutional because of its detrimen-
69. Id at 1077-78. The court did not believe that the legislature had believed the criminal
sanction of§ 95-99 would assure compliance with § 95-98. The court noted that the only possible
punishment for a labor union or a city, town, county or other municipal corporation that violates
§ 95-98 is a fine. Even though § 95-99 authorizes up to two years' imprisonment, the court in-
ferred that it would be against legislative intent to authorize even a fine against North Carolina
municipal corporations. Id
70. Id at 1077.
71. Although the constitutionality of § 95-100 was not challenged in Atkins, that statute's
intended effect--to make clear that a municipality may require union nonmembership as a condi-
tion of employment-is clearly unconstitutional under the Altkins rationale.
72. 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974). See generally Note, supra note 5.
73. The sanctions consisted of "notice to members and prospective members of the teaching
profession that they were advised not to seek employment in the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County
school system because of unsatisfactory conditions detrimental to the profession and the children
of the community." Pfefferkorn, supra note 5, at 199; see Note, supra note 5, at 733.
74. Pfefferkorn, supra note 5, at 197-200.
75. 381 F. Supp. at 645-46.
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tal effect on the teachers' ability to associate in a labor union.76 The union
complained that individual teachers would become disenchanted and leave
the organization because the school board refused to work with the union.
77
The court stated, however, that even accepting the alleged consequences
as true, it would not accept the proposition that the right of association re-
quires state governmental units to negotiate and to enter into contracts with
unions.78 Relying on Atkins, the court said "[t]he Constitution does not man-
date that anyone, either the government or private parties, be compelled to
talk to or contract with an organization." 79 The court noted that "the decision
whether to permit public employees to engage in collective bargaining with the
government involves far greater interests than the mere right to association."80
IV. SECTION 95-98 AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CAROLINA
After Atkins and Phillips, it is well-settled that North Carolina may not
prohibit public employees from joining or organizing a union without violat-
ing first amendment freedom of association rights,8 ' but the state may consti-
tutionally prohibit collective bargaining contracts with public employee
unions.82 Left unsettled is precisely what types of interaction, if any, between




80. Id at 647. The court cited selected portions of two antithetical authorities to support its
holding: Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: .4 PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974)
(favoring public sector unionism); Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining, 10
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25 (1974) (opposing public sector unionism).
81. See also Lontine v. Van Cleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Hanover Township Fed'n
of Teachers, Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972);
AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th
Cir. 1968); Bateman v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 298 F. Supp. 999 (D.S.C. 1969).
Supervisors of public organizations, however, may be prohibited from joining the same union
as other employees, but only if such officers have real supervisory autho'ity. Fire Fighters Local
2498 v. York County, 589 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1978).
82.. See also Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1954 v. Hanover Community
School Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972); Newport News F.F.A., Local 794 v. City of Newport
News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972).
The provision of the North Carolina statutes authorizing the state's board of transportation
"to do all things required under applicable federal legislation to administer properly the federal
mass transportation programs" arguably would include entering into collectively bargained con-
tracts pursuant to § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1969, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c)
(1976). The issue will probably never be tested in court because the state has made a policy
decision not to participate in programs requiring § 13(c) agreements. Nolan, supra note 3, at 291.
Local governments have applied for such grants but have avoided conflict with § 95-98 by con-
tracting out the management of transit systems to private companies not protected from bargain-
ing duties under the NLRA's exemption for government agencies. Id This "contracting out" of
matagement duties has apparently been used on occasion in areas other than transportation.
Haemmal, Stalemate in North Carolina: The Increasing Need for a Viable Public Employees
Labor Relations Act 29 (Jan. 1979) (unpublished paper).
Additionally, dues checkoff arrangements apparently are not barred by § 95-98 despite some
authority to the contrary. In Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Charlotte, 381 F.
Supp. 500 (W.D.N.C. 1974), the court held that § 95-98, relied on by the city as prohibiting such
an arrangement, was not applicable because no contracts or agreements were contemplated be-
tween the city and the union, but rather between the city and individual employees. Id at 503.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, stating that although § 95-98
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a union and a governmental unit are permitted or authorized under section 95-
98. The confusion surrounding the statute is illustrated both by the varying
interpretations offered by different parties,83 and by the inconsistency of actual
practices across the state.
84
Recent disagreement over section 95-98 has focused on the permissibility
of any private discussions or dealings between governmental units and a union
of its employees. Several cities and governing agencies have maintained that
government employers in North Carolina cannot recognize, meet and discuss
with, bargain with or otherwise "deal" with a labor union.85 Under normal
circumstances 86 a governmental unit has no legal obligation to meet with
prohibits contracts, it does not require prohibition of dues withholding from the payroll of state
employees. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 518 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir.
1975). The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision that such checkoffs, if
accorded to other organizations, were required to be made for unions on equal protection grounds.
City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 289 (1976). For further
discussion of City of Charlotte, see Livingston, The Southern Public Employee Unions' Constita-
tional Card, Utilization of the Equal Protection Clause, this symposium. The court never reached
the question whether § 95-98 prohibited such arrangements. 426 U.S. at 286-87. Such checkoff
arrangements have existed and do exist today in a number of municipalities. Haemmal, supra, at
29; Pfeerkorn, supra note 5, at 195. The North Carolina Attorney General's office suggested, in
an opinion issuecr prior to Local 660, that dues checkoff agreements were prohibited by § 95-98.
40 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 591 (1969). See also Nolan, supra note 3, at 289.
83. This confusion is not new. A governor's special commission, convened in 1970 to study
the status of public employee unionism in North Carolina at the local level, stated that "It]he
months since the District Court decision [referring to Atkins] have been marked by ... confusion
as to what a governing authority and labor organization can and cannot do under G.S. 95-98."
N.C. STUDY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 3. See also Note, supra note 5, at 732.
One recently suggested interpretation is that § 95-98, like § 95-97, is meant to apply only to
policemen and firefighters. Interview with John Brooks, N.C. Commissioner of Labor (Feb. 19,
1980); see Collective Bargainingfor Teachers: Legaliy Unclear, Chapel Hill Newspaper, July 9,
1980, at 1, col. I; Raleigh News & Observer, July 9, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Haemmal, supra note 83, at
29. Commissioner Brooks argues that an improper codification of the original house bill carried
an error into the bound version. The original bill read, in § 95-95, now § 95-97, "[T]he terms
,employee,' public 'employee,' or 'employees' whenever used in this Section shall mean any regu-
lar and full-time employee engaged exclusively in law enforcement or fire protection." H.B. 118,
1959 Sess. (emphasis added). The original bill also began:
The GeneralAssembly of North Carolina do enact:
SECTION 1. Chapter 95, as the same appears in the 1958 Replacement Volume 2C
of the General Statutes, Replacement 1958, is hereby amended by adding thereto a new
article, which shall be designated as "Article II", and which shall read as follows:...
The four statutes followed. It is his view that the word "Section" in the definition of public em-
ployees was meant to refer to all of§ I, or all of what is now article 12, including § 95-98. When
the bill was codified into the bound version the capital "S" in "Section" was changed to a small
"s" and hence, the argument goes, the misconstruction. The Attorney General's office has specifi-
cally rejected Commissioner Brooks' interpretation. Letter from Rufus L. Edminsten, Attorney
General, to John McCormick, Attorney for the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Education (July
3, 1980).
84. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
85. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, City of
Winston-Salem v. Chauffers Local No. 391, 79 CvS 1464, at 4, 6 (Sup. Ct. Div. 1979). See also,
Misinterpreting Labor Law, Raleigh News & Observer, Feb. 14, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
86. A public employer who has discussed terms and conditions of employment with agents of
unions an- other public employee organizations may be violating the equal protection rights of
members of other unions if it refuses to engage in similar discussions with agents of these other
unions without a justifiable explanation for such disparate treatment. O'Brien v. Leidinger, 452 F.
Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1978). See Livingston, supra note 83. But see Beauboeufv. Delgado College,
303 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1969), aft'd, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970).
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union representatives to engage in private discussions with them.87 The prop-
osition that it cannot do so because of section 95-98, however, is quite another
matter. Because public employers in North Carolina do refuse to meet with
unions on the ground that state law prohibits them from doing so, the distinc-
tion is an important one.
The rationale suggested to support the view that section 95-98 prohibits
all meetings and discussions is that, although the statutory language refers spe-
cifically only to the enforceability of contracts, it implicitly precludes all col-
lective bargaining,88 including any meaningful discussions. This proposition
is simply a distortion of the statutory language.
89
Even assuming that section 95-98 forbids collective bargaining, which on
its face it does not, a distinction exists between such bargaining and mere
meetings to discuss issues relevant to the employer-employee relationship.
The concept of collective bargaining as generally understood implies two bar-
gaining entities of coequal status, each with a duty to meet and bargain in
good faith, and with the power to enter into binding commitments. 90 Addi-
tionally, collectively bargained contracts, almost without exception, never oc-
cur without some form of exclusive representation. 91 None of these elements
are present when a governmental unit's representative merely sits with a union
representative and discusses issues of concern to both. The courts in several
jurisdictions have discussed this distinction in detail;92 others have recognized
it as an obvious principle. For example, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, relying on Atkins to find no obligation by a
governing unit to enter into a collectively bargained agreement in the absence
of a statute, stated; "We hasten to point out that while public employees do not
have the right to collectively bargain, they are not precluded from sitting down
at a table with representatives of the city and discussing matters concerning
87. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 99 S. Ct. 1826 (1979) (first
amendment, at least in the context of employee grievance procedures, does not impose any affirm-
ative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or to recognize a union and bargain with
it).
88. There is some support in dicta for this interpretation in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
("collective bargaining for inmates with respect to pay, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of incarceration is illegal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-98.")
89. As a practical matter, such an interpretation of § 95-98 is impossible to enforce. See
Nolan, supra note 3, at 287-92. See also Letter from North Carolina Attorney General's Office to
Rep. J. Marvin Johnson, at 2 (April 6, 1970).
90. See State Bd. of Regents v. United Packinghouse Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110,
113-14 (Iowa 1970).
91. Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit
Legislative 4uthorization, 54 IowA L. REv. 539, 543 (1969).
92. Eg., Board of Education v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz. App. 504, 498 P.2d 578
(1972); Natter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946); Norwalk Teach-
ers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); State Bd. of Regents v. United
Packinghouse Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v.
American Fed'n of State Employees, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964); City of Pawtucket v.





The North Carolina Attorney General apparently agrees. In 1969 the At-
torney General advised the Guilford County School System that under the
state law the school board had "no authority to recognize professional organi-
zations or their representatives as bargaining agentsfor group or collective con-
tracts,"94 but that this did not preclude meetings and discussion. The same
opinion noted that "[w]hat we have said does not prohibit representatives of
professional organizations from meeting with and talking with school boards
as to matters related to teachers just as anyone could talk with such boards
about educational matters." 95 Furthermore, in a subsequent letter approving
a Charlotte employee relations plan, the Attorney General's office advised,
"nor would it seem harmful for any union agent.., to talk to the City Coun-
cil and make suggestions about wages, hours, and working conditions as long
as the city does not have to bargain with a labor union looking toward a collec-
tive agreement or contract. '96 Most recently, the Attorney General's office has
suggested, although not by means of a formal advisory opinion, that only the
contract, not the negotiation process itself, is prohibited by section 95-98.
97
The United States District Court for the Western District of North Caro-
lina recently addressed this point in Hickory Fire Fighters Association Local
2653 v. City ofHickory.98 The Hickory Fire Fighters Association and some of
its members alleged, inter alia, that the city had violated their first and four-
teenth amendment rights by refusing to allow them to speak with the city
council while others similarly situated had been granted permission to do so.
The City contended that the union was prohibited from speaking by section
95-98 and that the fire fighters should instead express individually any view
they might have through esfablished grievance procedures. In an unpublished
opinion, the court stated in dictum: "[E]ven though a local government cannot
enter into a contract with a labor union [under section 95-98], the statute does
not prohibit discussion between the two." 99
In addition to holding discussions with public employee unions about is-
sues of mutual concern, governmental units should be able, under section 95-
98, to meet legally and engage in more thorough consultations and, if desired,
reach oral or written "understandings," even though such understandings
would not be enforceable. Although North Carolina is not generally consid-
93. Newport News Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13, 17
(E.D. Va. 1972).
94. 40 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 274, 276 (1969) (emphasis added).
95. Id
96. Letter from Attorney General Robert Morgan by Deputy Attorney General Ralph
Moody to Representative Arthur H. Jones (April 17, 1966) (emphasis added). See also Pfef-
ferkorn, supra note 5, at 191-93.
97. Collective Bargainingfor Teachers: Legality Unclear, Chapel Hill Newspaper, July 9,
1980, at 8A, col. 2.
98. No. ST-C-79-31 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 1980).
99. Id at 3. See also Memorandum of Decision, Hickory Firefighters Ass'n Local 2653 v.
City of Hickory, ST-C-79-31, at 5-6 (W.D.N.C. July 23, 1980).
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ered a "meet and confer" state, 10 the distinction between permissible activity
in states that have been so characterized and North Carolina is so slight as to
be almost nonexistent.' 0 ' Under one "meet and confer" model of public sec-
tor labor relations, public employers may discuss working conditions with un-
ions and may, in some instances, memorialize in writing any understandings
reached, but cannot enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement. 102
When enacting section 95-98, the North Carolina Legislature specifically re-
jected a measure that would have declared "understandings" as well as con-
tracts and agreements void and against public policy.'0 3 The Atkins and
Phills decisions, as well as the attorney general opinions, have treated sec-
tion 95-98 as only declaring void certain contracts, or at most, prohibiting bar-
gaining with an eye to a collectively bargained contract. 1' 4 Unlike formal
contracts, such consultations and nonbinding understandings cannot be
viewed as improper delegations of sovereign power, requiring specific legisla-
tive authorization.10 5 A public employer's general power to carry out its as-
signed functions, including the setting of wages and working conditions, is
sufficiently broad to include authority to consult with all employees affected
by those functions. Such consultation actually serves the public interest by
permitting more informed governmental action, and does not abridge govern-
mental freedom of action.'
0 6
The uncertainty concerning activity permissible under section 95-98 is re-
flected in the great variety of interactions that have existed and continue to
exist across the state. Although little reliable data on the precise nature of
these communications is available, 10 7 past studies have shown that several
governmental units have engaged in fairly extensive discussions and negotia-
tions with public employee unions under varying circumstances, including the
use of memoranda of understanding of the type described above.1
08
100. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 3, at 255. For a definition of "meet and confer", see note 31
supra.
101. Nolan, supra note 3, at 287; Brough, Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees: Perspec-
tives and Prospects, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, Winter 1976, at 25.
102. Nolan, supra note 3, at 275. There also exists a mandatory "meet and confer" model,
where the public employer is required to confer in good faith with the representatives of its em-
ployees. See ADVISORY COMMISSION IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1970), reprinted in 1 GOV'T. EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA Reference File) 51:101.
103. See note 49 supra.
104. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. at 1077; Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit,
N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. at 647; 40 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 274, 276 (1969);
Letter from Attorney General Robert Morgan by Deputy Attorney General Ralph Moody to Rep-
resentative Arthur H. Jones, April 17, 1969. See also Machen, Public Employees-The Critical
Labor Relations Problem Affecting All Citizens, N.C.B.A. LAB. RELS. v-I, v-12 (1971); Raleigh
News & Observer, Misinterpreting Labor Law, Feb. 14, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
105. See Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz. App. 504, 498 P.2d 578; State Bd.
of Regents v. United Packinghouse Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970).
106. See, ag., Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 277 So.2d 868 (1973).
107. See Jedel & Rutherford, supra note 20, at 488.
108. For examples of past negotiations between public employee unions and governmental
groups in cities such as Raleigh, Greensboro, Wilson, Charlotte, Durham, and Winston-Salem,
see Machen, supra note 109, at v-12; Pfefferkorn, supra note 5, at 194; N.C. STUDY COMM'N, supra
note 5, at 4; Note, supra note 5; at 739.
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A brief survey of recent practices discloses that the range of communica-
tion between unions and different governmental units or authorities covers a
broad spectrum. At one extreme, governmental employers have refused to al-
low union representatives to speak at open meetings even though other mem-
bers of the public are allowed to participate. Other units have permitted union
representatives to make suggestions at public meetings, but no more. Some
employers have entered into discussions with union representatives, but have
refused to formally recognize the representatives as such. In some situations
informal exchanges between the employer and the union have developed, as
have negotiations of a sort, but both parties carefully avoid a discussion of the
exact role of the union. In other cases, "meet and confer" activity has oc-
curred regularly. Actual written contracts and agreements have even been
made, with neither party challenging their enforceability. In sum, negotiation
between public employers and the representatives of their employees has be-
come, in one form or another, an accepted practice in North Carolina. 10 9
V. CONCLUSION
Public sector collective bargaining is considered by many to be among the
most important issues in modem labor relations and public administration. 10
In North Carolina, this complicated question is treated by a single, restrictive
legislative sentence enacted twenty-one years ago. Some defenders of the stat-
ute have suggested that section 95-98 does not reflect an opposition to public
employees or public employee unionism per se, but instead a paternalistic
view of employer-employee relations in general. As expressed in a letter from
a North Carolina assistant attorney general shortly after enactment of the stat-
ute:
You see here in this ignorant Southland we are not too well indoctri-
nated in sociological theories of togetherness and we have the quaint,
old-fashioned and archaic notion that public employees are paid
from appropriations made by the sovereign, and when the appropria-
tion is enacted the process of bargaining has no place. We always
thought that public employees owed allegiance and loyalty to the
units of government who paid them and for whom they worked. We
never thought that it was necessary for an outside organization to
look after public employees. We simply do not have strikes among
public employees because the employees know that this would not be
tolerated. We think that most of the public employees would say
109. The information gathered on present employer-union activity is the result of conversa-
tions with attorneys for both public employers and public employee unions, and with many local
union representatives. Confirmation of each of the types of activity described in text was given by
John Brooks, Commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Labor, in interviews in June,
1979, and February, 1980. Many union representatives requested that precise circumstances or
employers not be made public, fearing that existing relations might be jeopardized or that other
repercussions might result.
110. See Machen, supra note 109, at v-2; Nolan, .supra note 3, at 303.
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that they are getting along fairly well."'I
Changing circumstances in the past two decades make this reasoning
doubtful today. North Carolina has seen numerous public employee
strikes,"12 and at least several commentators do not believe that public em-
ployees are still "getting along fairly well."13
Representatives of public employers and public employee unions, 14 gov-
ernment officials," l5 and most commentators 16 generally agree that public
sector organizing and unionization will eventually increase substantially in
states such as North Carolina, and that demands for collective bargaining will
increase rather than decrease. Despite criticisms of section 95-98117 and nu-
merous attempts to modernize it,"l8 the legislature has as yet refused to grant
public employees any rights greater than those guaranteed by the United
111. Letter from an unnamed North Carolina Assistant Attorney General to the Harvard Law
Review, quoted in 75 HARv. L. REV. 391, 391 n.2 (1961).
The degree of allegiance sometimes expected of employees is suggested by the statement
signed by a candidate for a teaching position in a North Carolina school system early in this
century:
I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and other conduct unbecom-
ing a teacher and a lady. I promise not to go out with any young men except insofar as it
may be necessary to stimulate Sunday-school work. I promise not to fall in love, to
become engaged or secretly married...
I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every
precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits in order that I may be better able to
render efficient service to my pupils. . . . I shall consider myself at all times the willing
servant of the school board and the townspeople ....
Preston, Is America Still a Company Town?, 4 Civ. LIB. REv. 54, 57 (1978).
112. Haemmel, supra note 5, at 206-08 provides a list of public sector work stoppages in North
Carolina from 1953 to 1973. An update is provided in the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Analysis of Work Stoppages Bulletins No. 1813 (1974); No. 1877 (1975); No. 1902
(1976); No. 1940 (1977); and No. 1996 (1978).
113. See, e.g., Haemmel, supra note 5, at 212; Haemmel, supra note 83; Pfefferkorn, supra note
5, at 209-10.
114. See, eg., Negotiating the Future, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 1979-2029, 1 Gov.
EMP. REL. REP. (BNA Reference File) 41:1001 [hereinafter cited as Negotiating the Future].
115. See, eg., Interview with John Brooks, Commissioner of North Carolina Department of
Labor (Feb. 19, 1980).
116. See, e.g., Negotiating the Future, supra note 119; Allen, Public Employee Relations, in
N.C.B.A., DEALING WITH AND REPRESENTING LocAL GOVERNMENTS VII-I, 17 (1971); McGriff,
supra note 15, at 2; Nolan, supra note 3, at 237; Stern, Public Sector Bargaining in 1985, 28 LAB.
LJ. 264, 274 (1977).
117. See Haemmel, supra note 5; Pfefferkorn, supra note 5.
118. The last decade has seen the introduction of more than half a dozen bills intended to
modify or repeal § 95-98. Included have been bills to simply repeal the statute, H.B. 218, 1977
Sess.; to specifically permit and authorize contracts, H.B. 349, 1977 Sess.; to replace § 95-98 with a
statute imposing on the public employer an obligation to bargain in good faith and permitting
contracts of one year duration, but specifically prohibiting employee strikes or slowdowns, H.B.
1070, 1973 Sess.; to prohibit contracts but require each governing authority to establish procedures
for processing employee grievances concerning terms and conditions of employment, including
employee representation by a union representative, S.B. 399, 1971 Sess.; and to require negotia-
tions with firefighters, S.B. 9627, 1971 Sess., and teachers, H.B. 1065, 1975 Sess. See Haemmel,
supra note 83, at 24. An attempt was made in the 1979 Session to add more restrictive legislation
to § 95-98, including a new limitation on the types of unions public employees might join and a
provision requiring that striking public employees be dismissed. H.B. 1461, 1979 Sess. Ironically,
the bill, eventually killed in the House, was introduced largely as a reaction to renewed effort by
the Teamsters to organize police officers in some of the state's larger cities. INSTITUTE OF Gov-
ERNMENT, N.C. LEGISLATION 1979, at 34 (1979).
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States Constitution. While a change in attitude of most North Carolina legis-
lators and public employees is unlikely in the immediate future," t9 the current,
but likely temporary, relatively peaceful period in public sector labor relations
should be used to learn from the experiences of other states and to plan for
inevitable pressures.120 At present North Carolina faces the future with a stat-
ute that has placed public employee-employer relations in a state of confusion.
Even though a proper interpretation of section 95-98 allows for meaningful
interaction between a public employee's union and an employer when the em-
ployer finds it necessary or convenient, the statute increases the frustrations of
public employees who want some meaningful voice in the management of
their workplace. Section 95-98 should be replaced with a clear statute that
provides public employees and employers with a formal process for resolution
of disputes through representation and negotiation.
MICHAEL G. OKUN
119. Interview with Rep. Ernest Messer (Jan. 22, 1980); Interview with Jim French, North
Carolina League of Municipalities (June 6, 1979).
120. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective andLegisative Opportunities,
15 WM. & MARY L. RaV. 57 (1973); Nolan, supra note 3, at 237.
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